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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the impact of birthplace diversity on economic
growth. We use panel data on US states over the 1960-2010 period. This rich data set
allows us to better deal with endogeneity issues and to conduct a large set of robustness
checks. Our results suggest that diversity among college-educated immigrants positively
aects economic growth. We provide converging evidence pointing at the existence of
skill complementarities between workers trained in dierent countries. These synergies
result in better labor market outcomes for native workers and in higher productivity in
the R&D sector. The gains from diversity are maximized when immigrants originate
from economically or culturally distant countries (but not both), and when they ac-
quired part of their secondary education abroad and their college education in the US.
Overall, a 10% increase in high-skilled diversity raises GDP per capita by about 6%.
On the contrary, low-skilled diversity has insignicant eects.
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1 Introduction
Patterns of international migration to industrialized countries have drastically changed since World War II
(WW2). On average, the share of foreigners in the population of high-income countries increased from 4.9 to
11.7% between 1960 and 2010 (Özden et al., 2011). This phenomenon has similarly aected the United States
(from 5.4 to 13.6%), the members of the European Union (from 3.9 to 12.2%), Canada and Australia (from 15
to 22%). In addition, this change has been predominantly driven by immigration from developing countries;
the share of South-North immigrants in the population of high-income countries increased from 2.0 to 8.7%
in half a century.1 The literature investigating the economic impact of immigration on the United States and
on other host countries has grown rapidly in the past decades (Borjas, 1994). It sheds light on how the welfare
of natives and economic outcomes are aected by the number and characteristics of immigrants. Among
the multiple transmission channels, the labor market, scal, and market size eects of migration have been
abundantly studied, and a growing consensus on how to formalize and quantify them has gradually emerged.2
Nevertheless, the growing inow of people coming from geographically, economically and culturally distant
countries raises specic issues, as it has conceivably brought dierent skills and abilities, but also dierent
social values and norms, or dierent ways of thinking. The macroeconomic eects of birthplace diversity, as
well as the channels through which they materialize, are still uncertain.
This paper empirically investigates the impact of birthplace diversity on the macroeconomic performance
of US states (proxied by their level of GDP per capita) since WW2. Our analysis combines three innovative
features. First, we rely on panel data available for a large number of regions over a long period. Our
sample covers all US states over the 1960-2010 period in ten-year intervals. This rich data set allows us to
conduct a large number of robustness checks, and to better deal with unobserved heterogeneity and other
endogeneity issues. This is crucial because economic prosperity and the degree of diversication in production
are likely to attract people from dierent cultural origins (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), implying that
causation is hard to establish in a cross-sectional setting. To control for unobserved heterogeneity and
reverse causation biases, our paper uses a great variety of geographic and time xed eects, and combines
various instrumentation strategies that have been used in the existing literature. Second, we systematically
investigate whether the economic eect of birthplace diversity is heterogeneous across skill groups. The
costs and benets from diversity are likely to vary with the levels of task complexity and interaction between
workers; meanwhile, high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants are likely to heterogeneously propagate social
values and norms across borders. We account for this by using skill-specic measures of birthplace diversity.
In addition, taking advantage of the availability of microdata, we compute our indices of diversity for dierent
1Immigration from developing countries accounts for 98% of the 1960-2010 rise in immigration to high-
income countries, for 80% in the European Union, for 120% in the United States, and for 150% in Australia
and Canada. Trends in immigration to the US are presented in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
2See among others, Borjas (2003), Card (2009), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Storesletten (2000), Dust-
mann and Frattini (2014), Iranzo and Peri (2010), di Giovanni et al. (2015), Aubry et al. (2016), Burzy«ski
et al. (2018).
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groups of immigrants (by age of entry or by legal status). Third, we conduct an exploratory analysis of the
channels of transmission through which birthplace diversity aects economic growth, and of the conditions
under which the growth-enhancing eect of diversity is maximized. To do so, we test whether diversity
aects the alternative outcomes of interest or intermediate variables inuencing the level and/or growth rate
of GDP per capita. We also use augmented diversity indices to investigate whether the gains from diversity
are inuenced by the cultural and economic distances between the origin countries and the US.
Our paper belongs to a recent and growing strand of literature, which considers (i) that culture can
be a feature dierentiating individuals in terms of their attributes, (ii) that such a dierentiation may
have positive or negative eects on people's productivity, and (iii) that culture is aected by the country
of birth (which determines the language and social norms individuals were exposed to in their youth, the
education system, etc.). On the one hand, homogeneous people are more likely to get along well, which
implies that cultural diversity may reduce trust or increase communication, cooperation and coordination
costs. Moreover, diversity can also be the source of epidemiological eects if immigrants convey the cultural,
social and institutional norms prevailing in their origin countries, as argued by Collier (2013) and Borjas
(2015). On the other hand, cultural diversity also enhances complementarities across diverse productive
traits, stimulating innovations and the collective ability to solve problems since a more diverse group is
likely to bring varied solutions to the same problem. Evidence of such costs and benets has been found
in micro studies. For example, Parrotta et al. (2014) investigate the eect of dierent forms of diversity
(by education, age group, and nationality) on the productivity of Danish rms, using a matched employer-
employee database. They nd a negative eect of worker diversity by nationality on productivity. On
the contrary, Ozgen et al. (2014) nd that birthplace diversity increases the likelihood of innovations using
Dutch rm-level survey data, and Boeheim et al. (2012) nd a positive eect of diversity on productivity
using Austrian data. In the same vein, Kahane et al. (2013) nd a positive eect of diversity on hockey team
performance using data from the NHL (the North American National Hockey League).
Contrary to the rm-level approach, the analyses conducted at the macro level account for interdepen-
dencies between rms, industries, and/or regions. Existing studies have identied signicant and positive
eects of cultural diversity on comparative development and on disparities in economic performance across
modern societies.3 Ottaviano and Peri (2006) use US data by metropolitan area over the 1970-1990 period.
In their (log of) wage regressions, the coecient of diversity varies between 0.7 and 1.5. Ager and Brückner
(2013) use US data by county during the 1870-1920 period: the coecient of diversity in the output per
capita regressions varies between 0.9 and 2.0. In these two studies, endogeneity issues are solved by using a
shift-share method, i.e. computing the diversity index on the basis of predicted immigrant stocks. More pre-
cisely, the change in immigration to a region is predicted as the product of the global change in immigration
3Ashraf and Galor (2013) use the concept of genetic diversity (based on the initial concept of expected
heterozygosity, that is the probability of selecting two random people from the population who are genetically
dierent) and nd a strong hump-shaped relation with the level of development around the years 1500 and
2000.
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to the US by the regional share in total immigration in the initial year. A more recent study accounting for
the education level of immigrants is that of Alesina et al. (2016); it is the most similar to ours. They use
cross-sectional data on immigration stocks by education level for a large set of countries in the year 2000,
and develop a pseudo-gravity rst-stage model to predict migration stocks and birthplace diversity indices.
They also identify a positive eect of birthplace diversity in countries with a GDP per capita above the
median, and a stronger eect for diversity among college-educated workers. The eect of diversity on the log
of GDP per capita is around 0.1 when computed on low-skilled workers, while the eect of diversity among
the highly skilled varies between 0.2 and 0.3. Similarly, Suedekum et al. (2014) use annual German data by
region from 1995 to 2006. Over this short period, they nd a weaker eect of diversity on the log of German
wages (about 0.1 for diversity among high-skilled foreigners, and 0.04 for diversity among the low skilled)
when xed eects and IV methods are used.
Our empirical analysis relies on high-quality US census data by state over the 1960-2010 period. The
choice of this period is guided by the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
led to an upward surge in U.S. immigration and diversity (as in Ottaviano and Peri (2006)). Birthplace
diversity is almost perfectly correlated with the state-wide proportion of immigrants, which has increased
threefold since 1960 in all skill groups. It is thus statistically impossible to disentangle the eects of birthplace
diversity from those of the size of immigration. For this reason, we opt for a benchmark model that includes
the immigration rate and a birthplace diversity index pertaining to the immigrant population. In line with
Alesina et al. (2016) and Suedekum et al. (2014), we nd that diversity among college-educated immigrants is
positively associated with the level of GDP per capita; however, diversity among less educated immigrants has
insignicant (or weakly signicant and much smaller) eects. Another remarkable result is that the estimated
coecient is divided by four when geographic and year xed eects are included. Still, our estimates are
greater than those reported in Alesina et al. (2016) and Suedekum et al. (2014): a 10% increase in high-
skilled diversity raises GDP per capita by about 6%. There is converging evidence pointing at the existence
of skill complementarities between workers trained in dierent countries. These synergies result in better
labor market outcomes for natives, and in higher productivity in the R&D sector. Our results are robust to
the exclusion of some census years, to the set of US states included in the sample, to the measurement of
diversity, and to the denition of a high-skilled immigrant. The results hold true when we eliminate states
with the greatest or smallest levels of immigration share, states located on the Mexican border, and states
with the lowest proportions of immigrants. They are also valid when we exclude undocumented immigrants
and those who arrived in the US at a young age. In addition, we nd no evidence of an inverted-U shaped
relationship as found by Ashraf and Galor (2013) for genetic diversity, or of a negative epidemiological eect a
la Collier (2013) and Borjas (2015). The growth-enhancing eect of diversity is maximized when immigrants
originate from economically or culturally distant countries (but not both), and when immigrants acquired
primary and part of their secondary education abroad and their college education in the US.
To address endogeneity issues, we combine placebo tests with IV regressions. As far as the latter are
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concerned, we consider two instrumentation strategies that have been used in the related literature. The rst
one is a shift-share strategy a la Ottaviano and Peri (2006) which includes the predicted diversity indices
based on total US immigration stocks by country of origin, and the bilateral state shares observed in 1960.
The second strategy consists in instrumenting diversity indices, using the immigration predictions of a pseudo-
gravity regression that include interactions between year dummies and the geographic distance between each
country of origin and each state of destination (in line with Feyrer (2019) or Alesina et al. (2016)). In both
cases, diversity among college-educated migrants remains highly signicant, while diversity among the less
educated is insignicant or weakly signicant. In the preferred specications, the coecient of high-skilled
diversity remains around 0.6. Since the average diversity index among college-educated immigrants equaled
0.937 in 2010; hence, increasing diversity from zero to 0.937 increases GDP per capita by 58%. However, in
2010, the high-skilled diversity indices of the US states ranged from 0.797 to 0.976. This implies that, if all
US states had the same level of diversity as the District of Columbia (0.976), the average GDP per capita of
the US would be 2.33% larger, the coecient of variation across states would be 2.37% smaller, and the Theil
index would decrease by 3.45%. By comparison, if all US states had the same average level of human capital
as the District of Columbia, the average GDP per capita of the US would be 8.32% larger, the coecient
of variation across states would be 9.77% smaller, and the Theil index would decrease by 16.06%.4 Since
the US-state average level of diversity among college-educated immigrants increased by 7 percentage points
between 1960 and 2010; this explains a 3.5% increase in macroeconomic performance (i.e. one ftieth of the
total change in the US level of GDP per capita).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our main diversity measures and
documents the global trends in cultural diversity since WW2. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy.
The results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Birthplace diversity in the US states (1960-2010)
Following Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Ager and Brückner (2013), Suedekum et al. (2014) and Alesina et al.
(2016), we consider that the cultural identity of individuals is mainly determined by their country of birth.
The rationale is that the competitiveness of modern-day economies is closely linked to the average level of
the human capital of workers and to the complementarity between their skills. On the one hand, workers
originating from dierent countries were trained in dierent school systems and are more likely to bring
complementary skills, cognitive abilities and productive traits. On the other hand, the diversity of the labor
force can induce communication and cooperation costs. Whether or not the gains exceed the costs is a key
empirical question.
4The GDP per capita of Hawaii (diversity index of 0.797) would be 11.66% larger if Hawaii had the same
diversity index as the District of Columbia; the dierence in high-skilled diversity explains about 4.7% of
the total income gap between Hawaii and the District of Columbia in 2010.
5
In our empirical framework, our key explanatory variable is an index of birthplace diversity (or frac-
tionalization), which can be computed for each US state and for the high-skilled and low-skilled populations
separately. In subsection 2.1, we dene various measures of birthplace diversity, establish links between
them, and discuss their statistical correlation with the average immigration rate. In subsection 2.2, we then
document the global US trends in cultural diversity observed since WW2.
2.1 The Birthplace Diversity Index
In line with existing studies, we rst dene a Herndahl-Hirschmann index of birthplace diversity, a term
which was rst introduced by Alesina et al. (2016). This index is denoted by TDKs,t and can be computed
for the skill group K = (L,H,A) (L for the low skilled, H for the high skilled, and A for both groups), for
each state s = (1, ..., S) and for each year t = (1, ..., T ). It measures the probability that two randomly-
drawn individuals from the type-K population of a particular state originate from two dierent countries of
birth. As shown by Alesina et al. (2016) in a cross-country setting, the birthplace diversity index is poorly









where kKi,s,t is the share of individuals of type K, born in country i, and living in state s, in the type-K
resident population of the state at year t. Computing the birthplace diversity index requires collecting panel
data on the structure of the population by region of destination, by country of origin, and by education
level. Our sample includes all US states (as well as the District of Columbia) between 1960 and 2010 in
ten-year intervals, i.e. s = (1, ..., 51) and t = (1960, ..., 2010). Our choice to conduct the analysis at the
state level is guided by the availability of long-term data series on macroeconomic performance, and by the
comparability with cross-country results. We identify a common set of 195 countries of origin, including the
US as a whole.5
Building on Alesina et al. (2016), the additive decomposition of the diversity index allows to distinguish





one hand, the Between component BDKs,t measures the probability that a randomly-drawn pair of type-K




5With the the exception of section 4.3.1, we disregard heterogeneity between US natives born in dierent
states (e.g. a Texan native is considered identical to a Californian one). See subsection 2.2 for a detailed
description of the data.
6In our specic case, kKUS,s,t represents the share of US natives in the type-K population of state s at
time t.
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On the other hand, the residual Within component WDKs,t measures the probability that a randomly-




kKi,s,t(1− kKi,s,t − kKUS,s,t).
In the US context, the evolution of the birthplace diversity index among residents is almost totally
driven by the change in the Between component of diversity, BDKs,t, which only depends on the proportion
of immigrants. The median share of the Between component in total diversity, BDAs,t/TD
A
s,t, equals 98%
and its quartiles are equal to 92% and 97%. Similar ndings are found for the low-skilled and high-skilled
populations. Consequently, birthplace diversity in group K is almost perfectly correlated with the state-
wide proportion of immigrants.7 On average, the Pearson correlation between TDKs,t and the total share of
immigrants in the population, mKs,t = (1−kKUS,s,t), equals 0.99 for all K. It is thus impossible to statistically
disentangle the eects of diversity from those of the size of immigration. For this reason and in line with
existing works, our empirical specication distinguishes between the size of immigration and the variety of
immigrants.
To capture the variety eect, we start from the Within component of the diversity index. The Within
component can be expressed as the product of the square of the immigration rate (the probability that two
randomly-drawn individuals are immigrants) by an index of diversity among immigrants, MDKs,t. The latter
measures the probability that two randomly-drawn immigrants from state s originate from two dierent
countries of birth. We have:





where k̂Ki,s,t = k
K
i,s,t/(1 − kKUS,s,t) is the share of immigrants from origin country i in the total immigrant
population of state s. Contrary to the total index of diversity and to its Between and Within components,
the correlation betweenMDKs,t and the total immigration rate, m
K
s,t, is small (on average, -0.19). This allows
us to simultaneously include these two variables in the same regression without fearing collinearity problems.
2.2 Data and stylized facts
Population data at the state level for the US are available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS). IPUMS data are drawn from the federal census of the American Community Surveys. For each
census year, they allow to characterize the evolution of the American population by country of birth, by age,
by level of education, and by year of arrival in the US, among others. We extract the data from 1960 to
7Table A4 in the Appendix provides correlations between diversity indices, and between diversity and
the immigration rate.
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Figure 1: Trends in birthplace diversity in the US, 1960-2010
(a) Total diversity (TDKs,t) (b) Diversity among immigrants (MDKs,t)
Notes: Total diversity (among residents) is dened as in Eq. (1), whereas diversity among immigrants is
dened as in Eq. (2). Source: Authors' elaboration on IPUMS data.
2010 in ten-year intervals, using the 1% census sample for the years 1960 and 1970, the 5% census sample
for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000, and the American Community Survey (ACS-1%) sample for the year
2010. Regarding the origin countries of immigrants, we consider the full set of countries available in 2010,
although some of them had no legal existence in the previous census years. Hence, for the years 1960 to
1990, data for the former USSR, former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia are split using the country
shares observed in the year 2000. In addition, we treat ve pairs of countries as a single entity; this is the
case of East and West Germany, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, North and South Korea, North and South
Yemen, and Sudan and South Sudan. Finally, we allocate individuals with a non-specied (or an imperfectly
specied, respectively) country of birth proportionately to the country shares in the US population (or to
the country shares in the US population originating from the reported region, respectively).
In our benchmark regressions, we restrict our micro sample to all individuals aged 16 to 64, who are
likely to aect the macroeconomic performance of their state of residence. We distinguish between two skill
groups. Individuals with at least one year of college are classied as highly skilled, whereas the rest of
the population is considered as low skilled. We dene as US natives all individuals born in the US or in
US-dependent territories such as American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and other US
possessions. Foreign-born individuals are referred to as immigrants. Observations are aggregated at state
level using IPUMS sample weights.
In alternative regressions, we only consider immigrants who arrived in the US after a certain age, or
immigrants who are likely to have a legal status. As for the age-of-entry correction, we sequentially eliminate
immigrants who arrived before the age of 5, 6, ..., 25. In order to proxy the number of undocumented
immigrants, we follow the residual methodology described in Borjas (2017), and use information on the
respondents' characteristics (such as citizenship, working sector, occupation, whether they receive public
8
Figure 2: Cross-state dierences in birthplace diversity, 1960-2010 average index
(a) Diversity among residents (TDAs,t) (b) Diversity among immigrants (MDAs,t)
Notes: Diversity among residents is dened as in Eq. (1), whereas diversity among immigrants is dened as
in Eq. (2). The two maps present the average birthplace diversity observed between 1960 and 2010. Alaska
and Hawaii are not represented. Source: Authors' elaboration on IPUMS data.
assistance, etc.).
We use IPUMS data to identify the bilateral stocks and shares of international migrants, kKi,s,t, in the
population of each state s, by country of origin i and by education level K in year t. We thus construct
comprehensive matrices of "Origin × State × Skill" stocks and shares from 1960 to 2010 in ten-year intervals.8
Missing observations are considered as zeroes, even if a positive number of immigrants is identied for an
adjacent year.9
The evolution of the average index of cultural diversity is described in Figure 1, whereas Figure 2
represents dierences in the average level of diversity across US states. Figure 1(a) describes the evolution of
the birthplace diversity index computed for the resident population, TDKs,t for K = (L,H,A), between 1960
and 2010. Looking at the average of all US states, the birthplace diversity index among residents increased
from about 0.09 in 1960 to 0.21 in 2010, reecting the general rise in immigration to the US. A large portion
of this change occurred after 1990. Nevertheless, this average trend conceals signicant dierences between
US states and between skill groups. As far as cross-state dierences are concerned, the number of immigrants
drastically increased in states such as California (+195%) or New York (+91%); on the contrary, the number
of foreign-born individuals remained small and stable in other states such as Montana or Maine. Regarding
dierences between skill groups, changes in immigration rates were larger for the low skilled than for college
graduates, particularly after the year 1980. This is mainly due to the large inows of low-skilled Mexicans
observed over the last three decades, which drastically aected the level of diversity in states located on the
8We distinguish between 195 countries of birth and 50 US states plus the District of Columbia. Countries
and states are listed in Appendix A1. Descriptive statistics by state are provided in Table A3.
9We identify 33,145 origin-state dyads with zero migrants out of a sample of 59,670 observations (i.e.
55.5% of zeroes). The missing values are mostly concentrated in the years 1960 and 1970. Information on
the country of origin is not reported for 0.3% of individuals at the micro level. We treat these observations
as missing information when we aggregate our data by country of origin at state level.
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West Coast and along the US-Mexican border (see Figure 2(a) below).
Second, Figure 1(b) describes the evolution of the diversity index computed for the immigrant population,
MDKs,t for K = (L,H,A). It shows that the evolution of diversity in the immigrant population varies across
skill groups. Diversity among college-educated immigrants has always been greater than diversity among the
less educated. This might be due to the fact that college-educated migrants are less prone to concentrate
in regions where large migration networks exist; they consider moving to more (geographically) diversied
locations. Dierences between skill groups drastically increased after 1960. On the one hand, diversity among
high-skilled immigrants increased during the sixties and seventies, possibly due to the the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965. Changes have been smaller since 1980 despite the Immigration Act of 1990, which
allocated 50,000 additional visas (in the form of a lottery) to people from non-typical origin countries. On
the other hand, diversity among low-skilled immigrants has fallen since 1980. Again, the latter decline is
mainly explained by the large inows of low-skilled Mexicans. Along the Mexican border and on the West
Coast, the probability that two randomly-drawn immigrants were born in two dierent countries decreased
as the share of Mexicans increased. This is also illustrated in Figure 2(b), which reveals signicant cross-state
dierences in the average level of diversity among immigrants.
In sum, the evolution of diversity among immigrants varies across US states and over time. We show in
the Appendix (see Figure A3) that diversity among immigrants decreased in states located along the US-
Mexican border and on the West Coast. A rise in diversity was observed in other states (such as Maine or
Vermont). Our panel data analysis takes advantage of these intra-state and inter-state variations to identify
a causal eect of diversity on macroeconomic performance.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to assess the eect of birthplace diversity on the macroeconomic performance of US states.10
The level of macroeconomic performance is measured by the log of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita. We present the benchmark specication in subsection 3.1. Subsection 3.2 explains how we deal with
endogeneity issues, relying on placebo and IV regressions and combining two instrumentation strategies.
3.1 Benchmark Specication
Our benchmark empirical model features the log of GDP per capita as the dependent variable. In line with
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Ager and Brückner (2013), Suedekum et al. (2014) and Alesina et al. (2016), we
10In the Appendix, a complementary analysis is conducted on the 34 OECD member states, using pop-
ulation data from Özden et al. (2011). The rst drawback of the database is that it does not report the
educational structure of migration stocks. To capture skill-specic eects, we combine it with the 1990-2000
estimates of the bilateral proportion of college graduates provided in Artuc et al. (2015). The second draw-
back is that it relies on imputation techniques to ll the missing bilateral cells. Despite the lower quality of
the data, our xed-eect analysis globally conrms the results obtained for US states.
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′Xs,t + γs + γt + εs,t, (3)
where log(ys,t) is the log of GDP per capita in state s at year t, MDKs,t is the type-K birthplace diversity
among immigrants (proxy for the variety of immigrants), and mKs,t is the proportion of immigrants in the
working-age population of type K. The latter is a key control variable that potentially captures the other
channels through which the level of immigration aects macroeconomic performance (e.g. labor market,
scal or market-size eects). We opt for a static specication and assume that changes in diversity fully
materialize within 10 years. This spares us from dealing with the endogeneity of the lagged dependent,
an important issue in dynamic models with a short-panel dimension (Nickel, 1981).11 Coecient β1 is our
coecient of interest. It captures the eect of birthplace diversity on macroeconomic performance.
Using skill-specic measures of cultural diversity and immigration, K = (L,H,A), we can identify
whether the level and signicance of β1 vary across skill groups. One might be concerned that using skill-
specic regressions leads to an omitted variable bias. This can be the case if the origin mixes of high-skilled
and low-skilled immigrants (and the skill-specic diversity indices) are correlated across states. However,
the main reason for using skill-specic regressions is that the correlation between mHs,t and m
L
s,t exceeds 0.9.
Hence, we estimate β1 separately to avoid collinearity issues. Nonetheless, unreported regressions (available
upon request) show that our results for diversity hold when including the two variables jointly.
We rst estimate Eq. (3) using pooled OLS regressions, bearing in mind that such regressions raise a
number of econometric issues that might generate inconsistent estimates. The key issue when using pooled
OLS regressions is the endogeneity of the main variable of interest, the index of diversity. Endogeneity can
be due to a number of reasons. These reasons include the existence of uncontrolled confounding variables
causing both dependent and independent variables, the existence of a two-way causal relationship between
these variables, or a measurement problem. To mitigate the possibility of an omitted variable bias, our
specication includes a full set of state and year xed eects, γs and γt, which allows us to partly account for
unobserved heterogeneity (including initial conditions in 1960). In addition, our benchmark model includes a
vectorXs,t of time-varying covariates through which immigration is likely to aect the level of macroeconomic
performance. It includes the log of population, the log of the state-wide average educational attainment of
the working-age population (as measured by the years of schooling or highest degree completed), and the
log of the urbanization rate. As highlighted in Angrist and Pischke (2009), these control variables can be
suspected of acting as bad controls if they are determined simultaneously with the level of diversity. For
this reason, we provide supplementary OLS and FE regressions without control variables in section 4.1. They
11Nevertheless, Tables F1 and F2 in the Appendix provide the results of dynamic GMM regressions with
internal or external instruments, and with dierent lag structures. In these regressions, the lagged dependent
is insignicant or weakly signicant, which reinforces the credibility of our static benchmark specication.
In addition, the eects of diversity are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the static model.
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show that our results are highly robust to the inclusion or the exclusion of these controls.12 Finally, to solve
the reverse causation and measurement problems, we use placebo tests and two methods of instrumental
variables described in subsection 3.2.
Finally, our benchmark specication in Eq. (3) assumes linear eects of the level of immigration and
of the variety of immigrants on the log of GDP per capita. However, the literature on diversity suggests
that the technology of transmission of cultural shocks can be dierent. In particular, another strand of
the literature focuses on migration-induced transfers of norms, and tests for potential epidemiological or
contamination eects. Transfers of norms from origin to destination countries have been examined by a
limited set of studies.13 Comparing the economic performance of US counties from 1850 to 2010, Fulford et
al. (2017) show that the country-of-ancestry distribution of the population matters, and that the estimated
eect of ancestry is governed by the sending country's level of economic development, as well as by measures
of social capital at origin (such as trust and thrift). Putterman and Weil (2010) study the eect of ancestry
in a cross-country setting, and nd that the ancestry eect is governed by a measure of state centralization in
1500. More recently, debates about the societal implications of diversity have been revived in the migration
literature. Collier (2013) and Borjas (2015) emphasize the social and cultural challenges that movements of
people may induce.
The birthplace diversity index used in the benchmark specication neither accounts for characteristics of
the origin countries not for the distance with the state of destination. Two strategies are used to account for
origin-specic characteristics and potential epidemiological eects. The rst consists in supplementing our
specication withMY Ks,t, the weighted average of the log of GDP per capita in the origin countries of type-K
immigrants to state s (the weights are equal to the bilateral shares of immigrants). The epidemiological





On average, the correlation between this term and the diversity index is small (around -0.17 across US
states), so that both variables can be tested jointly. Similarly, the correlation with the immigration rate is
small as well (-0.26).14
12Table B10 in the Appendix reports the results of IV regressions without controls. Remember that we
also provide System-GMM regressions in Table F1 and F2 that correct for the endogeneity of each covariate
using its own lags as instruments. These robustness checks conrm the results of our benchmark regressions.
13More studies focus on emigration-driven contagion eects, i.e. the eects of migrants' destination-
country characteristics on outcomes at origin. The most popular study is that of Spilimbergo (2009), which
investigates the eect of foreign education on democracy. Beine et al. (2013) and Bertoli and Marchetta
(2015) use a similar specication to examine the eect of emigration on source-country fertility. Lodigiani and
Salomone (2012) nd that emigration to countries with greater female participation in parliament increases
female participation in the origin country. More recently, Docquier et al. (2016) and Barsbai et al. (2017)
nd that emigration to democratic countries has a positive eect on the quality of institutions in developing
countries.
14Alesina et al. (2016) control for such epidemiological terms and nd insignicant eects. Compared
12
The second strategy consists in replacing MDKs,t by an augmented Greenberg index (Greenberg, 1956)
that accounts for the economic and cultural distances between the origin country and the US. By varying the
parameters of the augmented index, we can uncover the conditions under which the benecial or detrimental




k̂Ki,s,t(1− k̂Si,s,t)× dUS,i × ei,t (5)
The Greenberg index combines two measures of distance, dUS,i and ei,t normalized between 0 and 1. For
each distance we use a standard logistic function allowing us to weight these distances by factors θ1 and θ2









For DdUS,i, we alternatively use time-invariant measures of linguistic and genetic distance. Data on
linguistic distance are taken from Head et al. (2010). DdUS,i is a dummy equal to one if a language is spoken
by at least 9% of the population in both countries. Data on genetic distance are taken from Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009).15








Variable Dei,t is proxied by the level of GDP per capita in the origin country only, to avoid using our
dependent variable on the right-hand side of the regression equation. The use of panel data allows us to
compute our Greenberg index with a time-varying measure of economic distance.
When both weights (θ1 and θ2) are equal to zero, our augmented index is equivalent to the standard
Herndahl index. However, when θ1 increases (for a given θ2), our Greenberg index over-weights immigrants
from culturally distant countries. Similarly, when θ2 increases (for a given θ1), our Greenberg index over-
weights immigrants from richer countries, i.e. from less economically distant countries.
to them, we consider several variants of Eq. (4) in the Appendix, and we also instrument epidemiological
terms.
15Due to missing values, we eliminate 12 countries from our sample of 195 origins (Andorra, Bosnia,
East Timor, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Occupied Palestinian




Although our benchmark specication includes time-varying covariates and a full set of xed eects, the
association between birthplace diversity and macroeconomic performance can still be driven by reverse
causality. As argued by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), diversity is likely to respond to changes in the
economic environment. The sign of the bias is ambiguous, especially when working at the state level. On
the one hand, an upward bias can be observed if more rapidly growing states attract more immigrants from
more diverse countries (e.g. due to higher income levels and business diversication). On the other hand, a
downward bias can be observed if more rapidly growing states attract more immigrants from a limited set of
origin countries (e.g. due to border and/or network eects). The example of states located on the Mexican
border is highly relevant in this context (see Figures 2(a) and 2(b) ).
Therefore, we use two strategies for dealing with reverse causation issues. As a placebo regression, we
rst augment our benchmark specication with natives' migration rates (denoted by nKs,t), and measures
of diversity computed for the native population (denoted by NDKs,t). More precisely, we use the IPUMS
data to identify the state of birth and the state of residence of each American citizen, and we compute
internal migration rates and indices of diversity by state of birth for both skill groups. The latter index
measures the probability that two randomly-drawn Americans from the type-K population of a particular
state originate from two dierent states of birth. If diversity responds to economic prosperity, we expect a
positive correlation between NDKs,t and GDP per capita.
Secondly, we use two-stage least-square estimation methods. We consider two dierent sets of instruments
that have been used in the existing literature, and show that our IV results are robust to the instrumentation
strategy. Our rst IV strategy is a shift-share strategy a la Ottaviano and Peri (2006) or Ager and Brückner
(2013). We instrument diversity with predicted indices combining the changes in US immigration stocks
by country of origin and the dyadic shares observed in 1960. More precisely, we predict the skill-specic
bilateral migration stocks for each state using the residence shares of natives and immigrants observed in
1960. Then, we use these shares to allocate new immigrants by state of destination. The predicted stock of









i,t − StockKi,1960), (8)
where StockKi,s,t is the type-K stock of immigrants from country i residing in state s at year t. Term φ
K
i,s is the
time-invariant share that we use to allocate the variation in the bilateral migration stocks observed between
the years 1960 and t. We thus allocate changes in bilateral migration stocks using the 1960 skill-specic
shares of US natives and immigrants from the same origin country. These shares capture both origin- and














where NatKs,1960 is the number of US natives residing in state s at year 1960. Using the predicted stock of
migrants (who are less likely to be aected by the economic performance of each state), we compute the
predicted diversity indices.
In line with Feyrer (2019) or Alesina et al. (2016), our second IV strategy consists in instrumenting
diversity indices using the predicted migration stocks obtained from a zero-stage, pseudo-gravity regression.
The latter regression includes interactions between year dummies and the geographic distance between each
country of origin and each US state. In line with the shift-share strategy, the identication thus comes from
the time-varying eect of geographic distance on migration, reecting gradual changes in transportation and
communication costs. The pseudo-gravity model is written:
log(StockKi,s,t) = βt log(Disti,s) +Bordi,s + Langi,s + γs + γi + γt + εi,s,t, (10)
where Bordi,s is a dummy equal to one if country i and state s share a common border, Langi,s is a dummy
equal to one if at least 9% of the populations of i and s speak a common language, γs, γi, and γt are the
destination, origin and year xed eects.16 In the pseudo-gravity stage, the high prevalence of zero values
in bilateral migration stocks gives rise to econometric concerns about possible inconsistent OLS estimates.
To address this problem, we use the Poisson regression by pseudo-maximum likelihood (see Santos Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006). Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-state pairs.
Although commonly used in the literature, each of these IV strategies has some drawbacks. We are aware
that the shift-share method is imperfect if potential regressors exhibit strong persistence, and that the relative
geography variables used in the strategy a la Feyrer (2019) can aect macroeconomic performance through
other channels such as trade, foreign direct investments or technology diusion (not measurable at the state
level for the 1960-2010 period). Nevertheless, we can reasonably support a careful causal interpretation of
our results if these strategies and the placebo regressions yield consistent and converging results.
4 Results
Our empirical analysis follows the structure described in section 3. In subsection 4.1, we investigate the eect
of birthplace diversity among immigrants using pooled OLS regressions; we produce separate results for the
total immigrant population and for the two skill groups. Then, we test for the existence of epidemiological
eects, and we control for unobserved heterogeneity, including a full set of state and year xed eects
(FE). In subsection 4.2, we show that the FE estimates are highly robust to dierent robustness checks and
subsamples. In subsection 4.3, we deal with endogeneity issues, discussing the results of placebo and IV
regressions. The latter rely on two instrumentation strategies frequently used in the existing literature (i.e a
16One could be concerned that the border dummies in the pseudo-gravity equation impose a very strong
functional form input on the instrumental variables estimates. However, it is worth noting that removing
these two variables from our equation does not change signicantly our main coecients of interests.
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shift-share strategy a la Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and a gravity-like strategy a la Feyrer (2019)). Finally, in
subsection 4.4, we extend the IV setting and conduct an exploratory analysis of the channels of transmission
through which birthplace diversity aects economic growth.
4.1 Pooled OLS and FE Regressions
Table 1 describes the pooled OLS and FE estimates without and with covariates in Tables 1(a) and 1(b),
respectively. We produce separate results for the three skill groups, K = (A,L,H), under the same set of
potential confounding factors. These include the skill-specic immigration rate, mKs,t, the log of population,
log(Pops,t), the log of urbanization, log(Urbs,t), and the log of the average educational attainment of the
working-age population, log(Hums,t). In all cases, our standard errors are clustered at the state level in
order to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The pooled OLS estimates are reported in col. 1, 3 and 6. The eect of birthplace diversity on GDP
per capita is skill-specic. Insignicant eects are obtained when diversity is computed using the low-skilled
immigrant population. On the contrary, the association between GDP per capita and high-skilled diversity
is positive and signicant at the 1% level. The coecient is large: a 10% increase in high-skilled diversity is
associated with a 27.2% increase in GDP per capita when potential confounding factors are accounted for,
and even more without controls. When computing the diversity index on the total immigrant population,
the eect remains signicant at the 1% level in the regression without controls, but it becomes insignicant
when the covariates are included.
Col. 2, 4 and 7 describe the (benchmark) results obtained when we add state and year xed eects. The
state xed eects account for all time-invariant state characteristics that could jointly aect productivity and
diversity; the year xed eects account for time-varying sources of change in GDP per capita that are common
to all US states.17 In the FE regressions, the R-squared is above 0.99. The eect of high-skilled diversity
remains highly signicant. Interestingly, the inclusion of xed eects leads to a drop in the coecient of
interest. It is divided by four compared to the pooled OLS regression. This demonstrates that accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity is crucial in this literature. As far as low-skilled diversity is concerned, the eect
becomes signicant in the regression without controls, but loses signicance once covariates are factored
in. Turning our attention to the potential confounding factors, human capital and urbanization rates are
signicantly and positively associated with GDP per capita. On the contrary, the correlation between GDP
and population size is negative. More interestingly, immigration rates are always positively associated with
GDP per capita, and the correlation is always greater for college graduates.
In col. 5 and 8, we supplement the benchmark model with epidemiological eects a la Collier (2013)
and Borjas (2015). Interpreting the coecient of the epidemiological term is not straightforward. On the
one hand, if immigrants originating from poor countries contaminate the total factor productivity or the
17In order to better deal with unobserved heterogeneity, additional regressions with region-by-year xed
eects are provided in the Appendix. As shown in Table B12, our ndings are not altered.
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Table 1: Pooled OLS and FE regressions
Results by skill group (Dep= log(ys,t))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
Skill level All All Low skilled Low skilled Low skilled High skilled High skilled High skilled
Table 1(a): Without control variables
Mig Divs,t 2.084*** 0.275*** 0.343 0.147** 0.096 7.595*** 0.664*** 0.556***
(0.581) (0.097) (0.498) (0.063) (0.060) (0.909) (0.209) (0.182)
Mig Shares,t 8.905*** -0.115 6.963*** -0.123 -0.152 9.912*** -0.019 -0.265
(1.267) (0.402) (1.053) (0.314) (0.315) (1.421) (0.452) (0.452)
MYs,t -0.150*** -0.174**
(0.048) (0.068)
Constant 7.099*** 7.847*** 8.738*** 7.960*** 9.285*** 1.931** 7.501*** 9.095***
(0.523) (0.087) (0.436) (0.059) (0.419) (0.861) (0.187) (0.614)
R-squared 0.283 0.991 0.236 0.991 0.992 0.452 0.992 0.992
Table 1(b): With control variables
Mig Divs,t 0.416 0.318*** 0.019 0.141 0.104 2.719*** 0.616*** 0.531***
(0.329) (0.114) (0.184) (0.086) (0.085) (0.719) (0.160) (0.159)
Mig Shares,t 2.632*** 0.582* 1.901*** 0.481* 0.412 4.383*** 0.614* 0.388
(0.615) (0.341) (0.485) (0.282) (0.283) (1.018) (0.315) (0.366)
MYs,t -0.104** -0.133*
(0.042) (0.069)
log(Pops,t) 0.070 -0.172** 0.079* -0.166** -0.146* 0.011 -0.155** -0.080
(0.047) (0.079) (0.047) (0.081) (0.082) (0.044) (0.075) (0.065)
log(Urbs,t) -0.407* 0.385** -0.367 0.329** 0.312* -0.563** 0.285** 0.156
(0.238) (0.156) (0.254) (0.163) (0.173) (0.229) (0.135) (0.138)
log(Hums,t) 5.752*** 0.695*** 5.817*** 0.807*** 0.802*** 5.288*** 0.759*** 1.007***
(0.157) (0.197) (0.147) (0.205) (0.196) (0.182) (0.197) (0.299)
Constant -0.697 7.529*** -0.728 7.662*** 8.379*** -0.584 7.348*** 7.492***
(0.890) (1.254) (0.914) (1.263) (1.317) (0.890) (1.262) (1.273)
R-squared 0.879 0.993 0.878 0.993 0.993 0.889 0.993 0.993
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306
Nb. states 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Time xed eects No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
States xed eects No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. The specication
is described in Eq. (3). Pooled OLS results are provided in col. 1, 3 and 6; FE results are provided in col. 2, 4, 5, 7 and
8. Results for all immigrants are provided in col. 1 and 2; results for low-skilled immigrants are provided in col. 3, 4 and
5; results for college-educated immigrants are provided in col. 6, 7 and 8. The sample includes the 50 US states and the
District of Columbia from 1960 to 2010. The set of control variables includes the immigration rate (Mig Shares,t), the log
of population (log(Pops,t)), the log of urbanization (log(Urbs,t)) and the log of the average educational attainment of the
working-age population (log(Hums,t)). We supplement our benchmark specication in col. 5 and 8 with the epidemiological
eect (MYs,t).
quality of institutions at destination, we should nd a positive and signicant relationship between our
epidemiological term (MY Ks,t) and macroeconomic performance. On the other hand, if attracting immigrants
from economically or culturally distant countries generates more complementarities in skills and ideas than
immigrants from richer countries, we should nd a negative and signicant relationship. Overall, controlling
for epidemiological terms does not aect our ndings. The eect of low-skilled diversity remains insignicant
in col. 5, and the eect of high-skilled diversity remains highly signicant in col. 8. These results are robust
to the specication of the epidemiological terms.18 In addition, it is worth noticing that we nd no evidence
18We consider alternative specications for the epidemiological term in Appendix Table C1. We rst
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of contamination eects after controlling for potential confounding factors. In col. 8, the coecient of the
epidemiological terms is weakly signicant and negative. In col. 5, the coecient is negative and signicant at
the 5% level. Such a negative eect suggests that low-skilled immigrants from richer countries may generate
fewer complementarities with the native workforce compared to immigrants from poorer countries. However,
reverse causality is a source of concern here since economic growth is likely to aect the attractiveness of
a state and the variety of its immigrant population. Our database reveals that richer states attract more
people, including immigrants from poorer countries. This selection issue pushes the correlation between
GDP per capita and the epidemiological term downwards.19 Such reverse causation issues are addressed in
subsection 4.3.
In sum, we nd that diversity is positively associated with the level of GDP per capita, but only when di-
versity is computed on workers performing complex or skill-intensive tasks. On the contrary, diversity among
less educated immigrants does not have a signicant eect on macroeconomic performance. According to
our xed-eect estimates, a 10% increase in high-skilled diversity (i.e. in the probability that two randomly-
drawn, college-educated immigrants originate from two dierent countries of birth) is now associated with
a 6.2% increase in GDP per capita. Expressed dierently, a one-standard-deviation increase in high-skilled
diversity is associated with a 3.2% increase in GDP per capita. This implies that, if all US states had the
same level of diversity as the most diverse state in 2010, i.e. the District of Columbia (0.976), the average
GDP per capita of the US would be 2.33% larger, the coecient of variation across states would be 2.37%
smaller, and the Theil index would decrease by 3.45%. By comparison, if all US states had the same average
level of human capital as the District of Columbia, the average GDP per capita of the US would be 8.32%
larger, the coecient of variation across states would be 9.77% smaller, the Theil index would decrease by
16.06% and the GDP per capita of Hawaii, the least diverse state in 2010 (0.797), would be 11.7% larger. In
addition, the US-state average level of diversity among college-educated migrants increased by 7 percentage
points between 1960 and 2010; this explains a 3.5% increase in macroeconomic performance (i.e. only one
ftieth of the total change in the US level of GDP per capita).
compute MY Ks,t by keeping the immigration shares (k̂
K
i,s,t) constant, at their 1960-2010 average levels. Then,
we keep the levels of GDP per capita at origin (log(yi,t)) constant, at their 1960-2010 average level. Finally,
we combine annual data on GDP per capita at origin with individual data on the year of arrival in the
US; each immigration share is multiplied by the average level of GDP per capita prevailing in the year of
immigration to the US. The latter specication allows us to capture the norms and values that immigrants
bring with them when they migrate. Due to data limitations, this variable cannot be computed for the
year 1960. Finally, we obtain the same conclusion when the epidemiological term in Eq. (4) is based on
democracy levels at origin, instead of GDP per capita. We use the Polity2 index of democracy. The results
for democracy are available upon request.
19Figure C1 in the Appendix conrms this presumption. When we keep the levels of GDP per capita
constant for all origin countries (at their 1960-2010 average), we observe that the US state level of GDP per
capita is negatively correlated with the epidemiological term.
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Table 2: Robustness of FE regressions for high-skilled diversity
(Dep= log(ys,t))
Sub-sample (B2) CZ (B4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full-Sample 1970-2000 No Top5 No Bot5 No Mex No Q1 CZ
Mig Divs,t 0.616*** 0.870*** 0.725*** 0.672*** 0.630*** 0.596** 0.319**
(0.160) (0.321) (0.174) (0.170) (0.170) (0.288) (0.150)
Mig Shares,t 0.614* 1.140** 1.317** 0.613* 0.541 0.765** 1.907***
(0.315) (0.459) (0.529) (0.323) (0.397) (0.365) (0.567)
Observations 306 204 276 276 282 228 3,688
Nb. states/CZs 51 51 46 46 47 38 741
R-squared 0.993 0.990 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.995 0.895
10 Largest (B5) Quadratic (B7) Educ. level (B8) Legal status (B9)
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Ph.D Tertiary Docum. Undoc.
Mig Divs,t 0.617*** -0.131 0.262** 0.369*** 1.009** -0.153
(0.169) (1.954) (0.103) (0.136) (0.473) (0.127)
Mig Shares,t 0.726* 0.622* 0.256 0.372 0.959* 4.426**




Observations 306 306 306 306 204 204
Nb. states 51 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.979 0.979
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state (or CZ)
level. A-indexed numbers in parentheses refer to full Tables provided in the Appendix. All models (except
col. 7) include the full vector of controls (not shown) with the log of population (log(Pops,t)), the log of
urbanization (log(Urbs,t)) and the log of the average educational attainment of the working-age population
(log(Hums,t)) as well as time and state xed eects.
? The sample for col. 7 includes the geographical area
of 50 US states and the District of Columbia from 1970 to 2010. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the average wage of white US natives between 40-50.
4.2 Robustness checks
This subsection investigates the robustness of the previous results. Table 2 summarizes the results for high-
skilled diversity. With the exception of the analysis by Commuting Zone (CZ), all regressions include the
full set of time and state xed eects and the set of covariates used in Table 1(b). The estimates for the
covariates are not reported here; complete tables are provided in the Appendix. In addition, robustness
checks for low-skilled diversity are reported in Table B1 in the Appendix. Irrespective of the specication
we always nd insignicant eects of low-skilled diversity on GDP per capita.
Robustness by subsample.  In Table 2 , the benchmark results of Table 1(b) are reported in col. 1. In
col. 2, we limit our sample to the 1970-2000 period, eliminating possible sources of variation prior to the 1965
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, as well as variations driven by the recent evolution of
diversity. Remember that Figure 1(b) shows that the average high-skilled diversity index slightly decreased
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between 2000 and 2010. Then, in col. 3 and 4, we examine whether the impact of diversity is driven by the
size of the immigrant population: we drop the ve US states with the greatest or the smallest immigration
rates in 2010, respectively.20 In col. 5, we investigate whether our results are driven by the Mexican diaspora,
which represented 30% of the whole immigrant population of the US in 2010. We drop the states located on
the US-Mexican border, which host 62% of all Mexican immigrants to the US.21 Remember that these states
have experienced a drastic decrease in their diversity index (-40% in low-skilled diversity between 1960 and
2010), which is entirely due to the rising inows from Mexico.22 Finally, in col. 6, we exclude the states in
the rst quartile (i.e. below Q1) of the 2010 distribution by immigrant population size.
Overall, we show that our FE results are robust to sample selection. In Table 2, the coecient of
high-skilled diversity is always positive, signicant, and of the same order of magnitude as the benchmark
estimates in col. 1. The positive impact becomes even larger when reducing the time span (0.87) or after
excluding the states with the highest immigration rates (0.73). This suggests that high-skilled diversity could
generate non-linear eects on macroeconomic performance; we will explore this hypothesis in col. 9 as well
as in subsequent sections.
Robustness to the geographical unit of analysis.  In col. 7, we check whether our results hold when
measuring diversity and immigration at the Commuting Zone (CZ) level, which better captures local labor
market conditions. We use the CZ classication described in Dorn (2009). Since GDP per capita is not
measurable at the CZ level, we follow Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and compute the logarithm of the average
weekly earnings of white US natives aged 40 to 50 as a dependent variable. Unfortunately, using weekly
earning forces us to restrict our sample to the 1970-2000 period due to data constraints on the number
of weeks worked in the 1960 census. Remember the decades 1960s and 1970s include the years with the
greatest sources of variation in birthplace diversity. Our results at the CZ level are qualitatively similar to
those obtained at the state level. We nd a positive and signicant eect of high-skilled diversity on the
weekly wages of natives although it becomes smaller and less signicant.
Controlling for large groups.  We also investigate whether the eect of birthplace diversity is not driven
by the presence of large diasporas characterized by specic productivity levels (this generalizes what we did
when excluding states located on the US-Mexican border). In col. 8, we control for the state-specic shares
of the ten largest origin countries in the US immigrant population. Controlling for the size of the largest
immigrant groups aects neither the signicance nor the magnitude of our coecient of interest.
20The states with the greatest immigration rates are California, New York, Hawaii, New Jersey, and
Florida. The states with the smallest rates are West Virginia, Mississippi, Kentucky, South Dakota, and
Alabama.
21They include California, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.
22As an additional robustness check, we also drop the Mexican diaspora from the computation of the
birthplace diversity index and the immigration rate, or we add the share of Mexican immigrants in the
state as a separate variable. This increases the coecients of high-skilled and low-skilled diversity, the latter
becoming signicant at the 5% level. Expanding the group of Mexican immigrants to all Hispanic immigrants
gives the same results. See Table B7 in the Appendix.
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Quadratic specication.  When estimating the eect of genetic diversity on economic development,
Ashraf and Galor (2013) and Ashraf et al. (2015) consider a quadratic specication, which allows them to
identify an optimal level of genetic diversity. In our context, diversity may also induce costs and benets,
implying that its eect on macroeconomic performance could be better captured by an inverted-U shaped
relationship. In col. 9, we thus supplement our benchmark specication by adding the square of the diversity
index. If an optimal level of diversity among immigrants exists, we should nd a positive coecient for the
linear term, and a negative coecient for the squared term. We nd no evidence of a quadratic eect of
birthplace diversity. The coecient for the squared index of diversity is insignicant in Table 2. Hence, this
regression rejects the existence of an optimal level of diversity among college-educated immigrants.
Robustness by skill group.  One might be concerned that the positive eect of high-skilled diversity is
driven by the presence of immigrants at the very top of the skill distribution. We investigate this issue in
col. 10 and 11 of Table 2. We nd insignicant dierences when computing diversity on PhD graduates, or
on other college-educated immigrants.
Robustness by legal status.  We also investigate the role of undocumented migration in governing the
skill-specic eects of diversity. The US census counts every individual regardless of immigration status.
Hence, undocumented immigrants inuence our diversity index. This can be a source of concern as they
are likely to be less educated than legal immigrants and to contribute dierently to GDP, either because
their productive activities are not recorded in the ocial GDP or because they are employed in jobs/sectors
where skill complementarities are smaller. This could explain why the eect of low-skilled diversity is
insignicant in most of our regressions. To explore this hypothesis, we use the residual methodology
proposed by Borjas (2017) to identify the number of legal and undocumented immigrants by skill group.
It consists in using individual characteristics to proxy the legal status of US immigrants. In this work, we
use ve characteristics (citizenship, employment industry, occupation, whether the individual receives any
assistance, and the spouse's legal status ) and, due to data availability, we apply the residual methodology
to the census years 1980 to 2010. We thus compute the diversity indices on the legal and undocumented
immigrant populations, and include them separately in our FE regressions in Col. 12 and 13 in Table
2. Distinguishing between legal and undocumented immigrants yields dierent eects. Diversity among
undocumented immigrants has no signicant eect, while diversity among legal immigrants has a positive and
signicant eect at the ve% level. On the contrary, controlling for the legal status of low-skilled immigrants
does not modify our conclusions (see Table B1 in the Appendix). This conrms that the insignicant eect
of low-skilled diversity cannot be attributed to the greater proportion of undocumented migrants in this
group (on average, 17% for the US in 2010).
Robustness by age of entry.  The diversity indices used in our benchmark regressions are computed
for the total population of working-age immigrants, whatever their age of entry in the US. As birthplace
diversity conceivably reects complementarities between individuals trained in dierent countries, it can be
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argued that immigrants who arrived in the US at dierent ages generate dierent levels of complementarity
in skills and ideas with the native workforce. However, the role of the age of entry is unclear. On the
one hand, immigrants with a longer foreign education are likely to bring more complementarities. On the
other hand, immigrants who were partly educated in the US may have more transferable skills and a greater
potential to interact with natives. To investigate this issue, we compute the diversity index using various
samples of immigrants, and we include these alternative indices in Eq. (3). More precisely, we exclude from
the immigrant population the individuals who arrived in the US before a given age threshold, which ranges
from 5 to 25 in one-year intervals. For each skill group, Figure 3 reports the marginal eect of diversity and
its condence interval as a function of the age-of-entry threshold.23 As information on age of entry is not
available in the 1960 census, our sample covers the 1970-2010 period. For this time span, the coecients
of the benchmark FE regressions (without controlling for age of entry) are equal to 0.835 for high-skilled
diversity (signicant at the 1% level), and to 0.088 for low-skilled diversity (insignicant). Whatever the age-
of-entry threshold, the eect of low-skilled diversity is insignicant. Nevertheless, the age of entry matters
for college graduates. Although the coecient of high-skilled diversity is always positive and signicant,
the largest eects are obtained when the immigrant population includes individuals who arrived before age
20. Considering three age thresholds (12, 18, and 22), Alesina et al. (2016) show that the positive eect of
birthplace diversity slightly decreases when eliminating immigrant children, but always remains large and
signicant. Conversely, our results suggest that the greatest levels of complementarity are obtained when
immigrants acquired primary and part of their secondary education abroad, and their college education in
the US.
Additional robustness checks.  Many other robustness checks were carried out to validate our results
and reinforce their interpretation. Some results can be found in the Appendix; others are available upon
request. Firstly, one might be concerned that our results are driven by other dimensions of diversity that
could be correlated with the variety of immigrants. In unreported regressions, we controlled for the racial or
linguistic diversity within the native population. The results are unaltered.
Secondly, we also computed the diversity index after aggregating immigrants by continent or by broad
region of origin. The results are available in Table B13 in the Appendix. Birthplace diversity then becomes
insignicant. This reinforces our presumption that the eect of diversity captures skill complementarities
that are driven by the heterogeneity in origin country characteristics. These complementarities are poorly
captured when aggregating countries within a broad region.
Thirdly, we checked whether our results hold when using alternative measures of diversity. Table B7
in the Appendix shows that they hold when replacing our Herndahl index by a Theil index of diversity.
The advantage of the Theil index is that it can be decomposed into two additive components: a within-
origin component that captures changes in the concentration of immigrants at the intensive margin, and a
between-origin component that captures changes in the concentration of immigrants at the extensive margin
23Comprehensive regression results are provided in Table B11 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Marginal eect of Mig Divs,t on log(ys,t)
Results for dierent age-of-entry thresholds (1970-2010)
(a) High-skilled (b) Low-skilled
Notes: The two graphs report the marginal eect of Mig Divs,t on log(ys,t) when the immigrant population
is restricted to individuals who arrived in the US after age X. Marginal eects are obtained using our
main specication Eq. (3) which includes state and year xed eects, as well as the immigration rate
(Mig Shares,t), the log of population (log(Pops,t)), the log of urbanization (log(Urbs,t)) and the log of the
average educational attainment of the working-age population (log(Hums,t)). Source: Authors' elaboration
on IPUMS data.
(see (Cadot et al., 2011)). Using this decomposition, we show that the positive eect of high-skilled diversity
is driven by the intensive margin (i.e. by a more balanced mix of origin countries with positive stocks
rather than by the entry of immigrants from new origin countries). In the same vein, our results hold when
using a measure of cultural polarization. In Ager and Brückner (2013), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003)
and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), the index of polarization captures how far the distribution of a








Applied to the immigrant population (i.e. using k̂Ki,s,t instead of k
K
i,s,t in the previous equation), the index
MPKs,t is maximized when there are two groups of immigrants which are of equal size (i.e. 50%). For US
states, the polarization index exhibits a correlation of -0.89 with the diversity index (this is much greater
than the correlation reported in Ager and Brückner (2013)). Hence, including these two variables in the
same regression is risky. As shown in Table B7 in the Appendix, replacing MDKs,t by MP
K
s,t gives the same
results as in our benchmark regression but with the opposite sign.
Fourthly, we investigated whether the same eects of diversity are obtained when considering alternative
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proxies for macroeconomic performance. In particular, population and employment levels may also react
to changes in total factor productivity. In unreported regressions, we did not nd any signicant eect of
diversity on the log of employment or population as a dependent variable. This might be due to the fact
that, in a context with mobility costs and with two types of workers, the relationship between productivity
growth and aggregate population/employment growth is less mechanical than in a context with perfect labor
mobility and one class of workers. Our results do not support an inuence of diversity beyond the income
eect.
Finally, we tested whether the size of skill complementarities between diverse immigrants can be at-
tenuated by the cultural distance between them. Our birthplace diversity index MDKs,t does not account
for the cultural distance between origin and destination countries. It assumes that all groups are cultur-
ally equidistant from each other. We considered an adjusted index that multiplies the probability that two
randomly-drawn immigrants were born in two dierent countries by a measure of cultural distance between
these two countries. For the latter, we used the database on genetic distance of Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009). Genetic distance is based on blood samples and proxies the time since two populations had common
ancestors. Again, the results reported in Appendix G are robust to the use of an adjusted diversity index.
4.3 Dealing with endogeneity
In this section, we investigate the likelihood that our results are driven by reverse causality. We use placebo
regressions in sub-section 4.3.1 and IV regressions in sub-section 4.3.2, treating birthplace diversity, immi-
gration rates and epidemiological terms as potentially endogenous variables.24
4.3.1 Placebo regressions
We now investigate whether our results can be driven by reverse causality (i.e. growing states attracting more
diverse immigrants). If diversity increases with economic prosperity, we can expect a positive correlation
between birthplace diversity among American workers and GDP per capita, as explained in Section 3. In
our placebo regressions, we augment the benchmark model with two additional control variables, namely the
natives' migration rates (nKs,t) and the measures of diversity computed for the native population (ND
K
s,t).
Since the range of variation of the diversity indices for immigrants and natives are dierent, we standardize
NDKs,t in such a way that it exhibits the same mean and standard deviation as MD
K
s,t.
24Another issue relates to self-selection if immigrants from dierent source countries have unobserved
characteristics and traits that are conducive to economic growth and that are captured by the diversity
index. We deal with this omitted variable issue in Table E1 in the Appendix. First, we follow Alesina et
al. (2016) and assume that self-selection on unobserved productive traits can be proxied by self-selection on
observable characteristics. We construct an index of selection on educational attainment in that we include
it in the benchmark specication. Still, it could be possible that self-selection on unobserved traits is poorly
captured by self-selection on educational attainment. Thus, we extend the analysis above and follow the
methodology proposed by Oster (2016) on the likelihood of an omitted variable problem due to self-selection
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Table 3: Mig Divs,t v.s diversity among native immigrants Nat Divs,t
Results by skill group (Dep= log(ys,t))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skill level High skilled High skilled High skilled Low skilled Low skilled Low skilled
Mig Divs,t 0.616*** 0.432** 0.141 0.156*
(0.160) (0.168) (0.086) (0.082)
Mig Shares,t 0.614* 1.008*** 0.481* 0.642**
(0.315) (0.347) (0.282) (0.278)
Nat Divs,t 0.719 0.879* 0.139 0.157
(0.486) (0.492) (0.174) (0.172)
Nat Shares,t 0.376** 0.428** 0.059 0.218
(0.167) (0.203) (0.242) (0.244)
log(Pops,t) -0.155** -0.135* -0.176** -0.166** -0.120* -0.169**
(0.075) (0.068) (0.073) (0.081) (0.067) (0.073)
log(Urbs,t) 0.285** 0.294* 0.316** 0.329** 0.266 0.304*
(0.135) (0.159) (0.149) (0.163) (0.164) (0.172)
log(Hums,t) 0.759*** 0.557** 0.477** 0.807*** 0.677** 0.505*
(0.197) (0.213) (0.217) (0.205) (0.271) (0.269)
Constant 7.348*** 7.058*** 7.091*** 7.662*** 7.493*** 8.049***
(1.262) (1.377) (1.389) (1.263) (0.988) (1.027)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306
Nb. states 51 51 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993
Time xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
States xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level.
Nat Divs,t is computed as the diversity among natives born in a dierent state than state s state
where they reside. It is standardized to exhibit the same mean and standard deviation as Mig Divs,t.
Nat Shares,t is the immigration rate in state s where immigrants are natives born in a dierent state
than s.
Table 3 reports the results of our placebo regressions: internal immigration rates are positively correlated
with GDP per capita. However, the native diversity index is insignicant (or weakly signicant in col. 3).
Although these placebo tests do not necessarily imply that diversity among foreign immigrants is not aected
by macroeconomic performance, they mitigate the risk of a strong reverse causation relationship.
4.3.2 Two-stage Least-Squares
We now check whether our results hold when instrumenting our main variables of interest. Table 4 provides
the results of our 2SLS regressions. In col. 1, 2, 6 and 7, we only instrument our main variable of interest,
MDKs,t, and use the two IV strategies explained in subsection 3.2. The rst one is a shift-share strategy, which
uses the predicted diversity index based on the 1960 geographic structure of each diaspora. The second one
is the gravity-like strategy a la Feyrer (2019). First-stage estimates are provided in Tables D2 and D3 in the
Appendix. Then, in the remaining columns, we deal with the endogeneity of two other important regressors,
the immigration rate (mKs,t) and the epidemiological term (MY
K
s,t). To do so, we use the gravity-like strategy
a la Feyrer (2019) only.
Col. 1 and 2 in Table 4 conrm our previous ndings for high-skilled diversity when MDHs,t is instru-
mented only. The eect of MDHs,t is always positive and highly signicant. When using the shift-share
on unobservables. In both cases we nd that self-selection is unlikely to drive our results.
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strategy (col. 1), the magnitude of the coecient is close to that of the FE regressions. The coecient be-
comes larger under the gravity-like strategy a la Feyrer (2019) (col. 2) even if it is not signicantly dierent
from the FE estimate. It is worth noticing that the instruments used in our IV regressions are valid. In
particular, the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat of our second stage is always very large, and satises the Stock-Yogo
critical values related to 10% maximal IV size. In addition, the F-test of the rst stage is always above the
critical value of 10. After instrumenting with the shift-share strategy, a 10% change in diversity induces a
5.1% change in GDP; equivalently, a one-standard-deviation change in high-skilled diversity increases GDP
per capita by 2.8%, which is close to our benchmark results. As for low-skilled diversity, we nd insignif-
icant or weakly signicant eects in col. 6 and 7. We conduct additional IV regressions to deal with the
endogeneity of the immigration rate and of the epidemiological term in the remaining columns of Table 4.
As the shift-share strategy does a poor job of predicting the immigration rate,25 we only use the gravity-like
strategy a la Feyrer (2019). Dierent combinations of endogenous regressors are considered and they all
give rise to the same conclusions. In all specications, the instrumental variables are strong. Our estimates
for MDHs,t are robust, and the magnitude of the coecient is similar to the FE estimates. The eect of
low-skilled diversity is always insignicant from col. 8 to 10. Under some specications, we obtain a negative
and signicant epidemiological eect for both college-educated and low-skilled immigrants. Again, we nd
no evidence of a contamination eect. On the contrary, our epidemiological results are more in line with the
eect of diversity: attracting immigrants from economically and culturally distant countries is benecial for
economic growth. Overall, our IV regressions support the view that increasing birthplace diversity among
college-educated immigrants causes a rise in GDP per capita in the receiving state.
4.4 Channels of transmission
In this section, we investigate the channels of transmission through which birthplace diversity aects economic
growth, as well as the conditions under which the eect of diversity is maximized. To mitigate endogeneity
concerns, we use the gravity-like IV strategy a la Feyrer (2019) and instrument the diversity index as well
as the share of immigrants.26
25The same problem arises in Alesina et al. (2016).




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.1 Alternative dependent variables
We rst produce exploratory regressions using alternative dependent variables. These dependent variables
include alternative outcomes of interest or intermediate variables inuencing the level and/or growth rate of
GDP per capita. We only focus on the eects of high-skilled diversity and of the share of immigrants in the
college-educated population. We are aware that each of these alternative regressions should ideally include
a specic set of appropriate controls. Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison, we use a common speci-
cation including the full set of xed eects without time-varying controls. The results of these exploratory
regressions are described in Table 5, which starts with the (benchmark) eect on GDP per capita in col. 1.
We rst test whether diversity impacts the average employment rate in the receiving state. A positive
eect on employment can be obtained if diversity stimulates linkages between sectors and rms, and/or if
it increases labor productivity (Peri (2012)). We use census data from IPUMS to construct our aggregate
measure of employment rate at the state level. The results in col. 2 show that high-skilled diversity does
not signicantly aect the log of the employment rate.
Secondly, we investigate the eect of high-skilled diversity on the performance of the R&D sector. A
positive eect on innovation can be obtained if diversity enhances complementarities in R&D activities and
improves the collective ability to solve problems. Such complementarities have been identied in the existing
literature. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) show that the number of patents per capita increases with the
number of college-educated immigrants in US states. Looking at the US Age of Mass Migration, Sequeira
et al. (2017) nd that immigration increases the number of patents registered by natives and foreigners. We
use data from the US Patent and Trademark Oce and compute the number of patents per capita for each
state and for each decade. In col. 3, we nd that high-skilled diversity increases the log number of patents
per capita.
Thirdly, we examine whether diversity aects social capital. It can be the case that the economic gains
from diversity are partly compensated for by a negative eect on trust, reciprocity or cooperation between
people. We proxy social capital using data on violence and other criminal oences. We extract data from
the US Department of Justice on the numbers of violent crimes and property crimes per capita, by state
and by decade.27 In col. 4 and 5, we show that high-skilled diversity does not signicantly aect the crime
rate. Interestingly, the level of high-skilled immigration is negatively associated with the number of property
crimes.
Fourthly, we assess whether the rise in GDP per capita benets native workers or immigrants only.
Recent studies on the labor market eect of immigration show that native and immigrant workers in a
given skill-experience group are imperfect substitutes (Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Manacorda et al. (2012),
Card (2012)). The estimated elasticity of substitution varies across countries. We test whether birthplace
diversity increases the level of labor market complementarities between immigrants and natives. To do so,
27Violent crimes include murders, non negligent manslaughters, rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults.
Property crimes include burglaries, larceny-thefts and motor vehicle thefts, among others.
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Table 5: Transmissions channels for high-skilled diversity
IV gravity-like strategy a la Feyrer (2019) (Dep= log(ys,t))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP cap (log) Employment (log) Patents (log) Violent crime (log) Property crime (log)
Mig Divs,t 1.063*** 0.056 3.011** 0.894 0.923*
(0.377) (0.066) (1.461) (1.279) (0.531)
Mig Shares,t 0.054 -0.131 3.277* -1.531 -1.912**
(0.755) (0.081) (1.963) (1.696) (0.893)
Observations 306 306 306 306 306
R-squared 0.991 0.773 0.315 0.822 0.848
Nb. states 51 51 51 51 51
Time xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
States xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
K-P F-Test† 49.70 49.70 49.70 49.70 49.70
Stock Yogo 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Wages HS (log)* Wages LS (log)* Diversity occ. HS Diversity occ. LS
Mig Divs,t 0.553* 0.718** -0.004 0.001
(0.286) (0.347) (0.013) (0.040)
Mig Shares,t 0.685* 0.555 0.014 -0.148***
(0.359) (0.364) (0.014) (0.054)
Observations 255 255 306 306
Nb. states 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.824 0.608 0.911 0.384
Time xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
States xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
K-P F-Test† 30.02 30.02 49.70 49.70
Stock Yogo 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58 7.03/4.58
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. The sample includes
the 50 US states and the District of Columbia from 1960 to 2010. (*) When the logarithm of weekly wages is used as a
dependent variable, the sample is reduced to 255 observations since data on the number of weeks worked are not included
in the 1960 US census. Data for GDP are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Employment data are computed
using IPUMS data and report the number of workers in the total labor force. Patents are the decennial total number of
utility patents per capita (patents for invention) granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce. Data on crime are taken
from the U.S. Department of justice. Violent crime reports the total number of violent crimes per capita in a given state
including murder and non negligent manslaughter, legacy and revised rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Property crime
reports the total number of property crimes per capita in a given state including burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle
theft. Following Borjas (2015), wages are measured as the log of natives' weekly wages (males and females aged 15 to 64).
Diversity Occ. is the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a state are working in two dierent occupations.
† Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic tests for weak identication (critical values from Stock-Yogo (2005) are given for 10%/15%
maximal IV size). We use the gravity-like strategy a la Feyrer (2019) to jointly instrument the birthplace diversity index and
the share of immigrants.
we use the log of natives' earnings as a dependent variable. In line with Borjas (2015), we use census data to
compute the average weekly wages of native workers by state, by education level, and for the years 1970 to
2010. Data on the number of weeks worked are not available for the census year 1960. Our sample includes
all natives aged 15 to 64 irrespective of their gender. In col. 6 and 7, we nd a positive and signicant
eect of high-skilled diversity on the log of natives' earnings. The eect is larger and more signicant for
low-skilled natives than for the highly skilled. Overall, these results suggest that diversity governs the size
of skill complementarities between native and foreign workers.
Finally, to push the analysis of complementarities one step further, we investigate whether birthplace
diversity increases the level of occupational diversity in the state of destination. Workers with a foreign
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background are more likely to start new businesses and to overcome labor shortages in certain sectors or
occupations. Using IPUMS data, we compute an index of occupational fractionalization by state and by
decade. This index measures the probability that two randomly drawn workers are employed in two dierent
occupations. As many occupations are skill-specic, we compute separate indices for the two skill groups. In
col. 8 and 9, we nd that the eect of birthplace diversity on occupational fractionalization is insignicant.
This result can be driven by the fact that occupational data are available at a low level of detail.
4.4.2 Drivers of skill complementarities
Our Herndahl index does not account for the economic, cultural, linguistic, or institutional distance between
the origin countries and the US. When adding separate epidemiological terms, we obtain insignicant or
negative eects. This suggests that attracting migrants from distant countries is benecial for growth on
average. We now explore whether the interaction between diversity and origin country characteristics matters
by using the Greenberg diversity indices dened in Eq. 5. The Greenberg index accounts for the cultural and
economic distances between the origin country and the US (with weights equal to θ1 and θ2, respectively).
When θ1 increases (for a given θ2), the Greenberg index over-weights immigrants from culturally distant
countries (i.e. from genetically or linguistically distant countries). When θ2 increases (for a given θ1), it over-
weights immigrants from richer countries (i.e. from less economically distant countries). Hence, we estimate
our benchmark specication using the Greenberg (augmented) diversity index under various combinations of
θ1 and θ2 (ranging from -10 to +10). This helps us identify whether and how origin country characteristics
inuence the size of skill complementarities between immigrants and natives. For every combination of θ1
and θ2, we instrument the Greenberg index using the gravity-like strategy a la Feyrer (2019).28
The results for high-skilled diversity are presented in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) (i.e. the top panel); the
results for low-skilled diversity are presented in Figures 5(c) and 5(d) (i.e. the bottom panel). In the left
panel, we use genetic distance as a proxy for cultural distance; in the right panel, we use linguistic distance.
We only plot the standardized coecients of augmented diversity that are statistically signicant at the 5%
level. The shade of grey is proportional to the magnitude of the eect: darker cells correspond to a greater
eect of diversity (i.e., the combinations of θ1 and θ2 generating greater eects on income per capita).
Conversely, lighter cells correspond to a smaller eect, and the coecients that are not signicant at the 5%
level do not appear (white color).
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the results for high-skilled diversity. When holding cultural distance constant
(θ1 = 0), over-weighting migrants from economically distant countries (θ2 < 0) increases the signicance
and the magnitude of the eect of diversity. This suggests that hosting immigrants from economically
distant countries brings complementary skills to the state of destination. On the contrary, over-weighting
immigrants from richer countries (θ2 > 0) leads to smaller results. In the same vein, when holding economic
distance constant (θ2 = 0), over-weighting genetically or linguistically distant groups (θ1 > 0) increases
28In all regressions the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is above the critical values from Stock-Yogo (2005).
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Figure 4: Augmented Diversity Index
(a) Genetic distance, High-skilled (b) Linguistic distance, High-skilled
(c) Genetic distance, Low-skilled (d) Linguistic distance, Low-skilled
Notes: Diversity among immigrants is dened as in Eq. (5). Each squared cell represents one estimated
coecient for MDK,Augs,t , which itself corresponds to a particular combination of θ1 and θ2. Blank squared
cells represent insignicant coecients at the 5% level. Each shaded cell corresponds to a signicant
coecient at the 5% level, and darker cells mean larger estimated coecients. Data on genetic distance
are obtained from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Data on linguistic distance are obtained from Head et
al. (2010). We use a dummy equal to one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both
countries. Source: Authors' elaboration on IPUMS data.
the signicance and magnitude of the eect of diversity. This suggests that cultural distance increases the
eect of diversity. At θ2 = 0, overweighting migrants that are linguistically close to US citizens leads to
insignicant results.
Economic and cultural distances are correlated. Nevertheless, looking at the interactions between them
sheds light on the benets from diversity and on the size of potential skill complementarities. Over-weighting
groups that are richer (i.e., economically closer) and culturally closer to natives always induces insignicant
results (top-left area of the gure). On the contrary, the greatest gains from diversity are obtained when
considering groups that are economically close to and culturally distant from natives (top-right area of the
gures). To a lesser extent, it is also growth-enhancing to attract high-skilled immigrants from culturally
close and economically distant countries (bottom-left area of the gure). Hence, cultural distance is benecial
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for the highly skilled when they originate from richer countries. Overall, in line with our skill complemen-
tarity hypothesis, diversity is benecial when immigrants originate from economically OR culturally distant
countries (but not both). These results hold when using genetic or linguistic distance as a cultural proxy.
These ndings partially hold for low-skilled diversity. Figures 5(c) and 5(d) show that low-skilled diversity
can also be growth-enhancing when immigrants come from economically distant countries. On the contrary,
the eect is always insignicant when over-weighting immigrants from richer countries. Signicant and
positive eects are obtained when immigrants originate from poor and genetically distant countries (θ2 < 0
and θ1 > 0). This result is not conrmed when using linguistic distance. Contrary to high-skilled diversity, we
do not nd evidence of a positive eect of attracting low-skilled migrants from countries that are economically
close but culturally similar. Cultural proximity among the low skilled is never growth-enhancing, although
we have not found any signicant and negative eect associated with high cultural distance.
5 Conclusions
This paper empirically investigates the impact of birthplace diversity on economic growth. We use a rich
data set that covers all US states in the post-World War II period. Compared to existing studies, we
take advantage of the availability of panel data to conduct a large set of robustness checks and to better
deal with unobserved heterogeneity and other endogeneity issues. We systematically test for skill-specic
eects of diversity. Using a full set of xed eects and combining various identication strategies, we show
that diversity among college-educated immigrants positively and monotonically aects the macroeconomic
performance of US states. This result is highly robust to the measurement of diversity, to sample selection, to
specication choices and to the instrumentation strategy. Contrary to existing studies, diversity among less
educated immigrants induces insignicant eects (or much smaller gains in certain limited circumstances).
The latter result holds when we control for the share of undocumented migrants in this group. Still, we
nd no evidence of an immigration-driven contamination by bad economic and/or institutional conditions
in origin countries.
Further important innovations are that we explore the channels of transmission through which diversity
aects economic growth, and we identify the conditions under which the gains from high-skilled diversity
are maximized. We provide converging evidence pointing at the existence of skill complementarities between
workers trained in dierent countries. These synergies are observed on the labor market, and in the R&D
sector. We show that high-skilled diversity increases the decennial number of patents per capita and the
average weekly income of low-skilled and high-skilled natives. The eect is maximized when immigrants
originate from economically or culturally distant countries (but not both), and when they acquired part
of their secondary education abroad and their college education in the US. In terms of magnitude, a 10%
increase in diversity among college-educated immigrants raises GDP per capita by about 6%, which is greater
than in recent studies. This implies that high-skilled diversity explains 3.5% of the output rise between 1960
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and 2010 in the US, and about 4% of the current output gap between the least and most diverse states.
Obviously, focusing on the US states over a specic period raises the problem of external validity of our
results. For example, there is no guarantee that diversity shocks propelled by Africa-to-Europe migration
or by intra-European mobility have generated the same economic responses. However, the cross-country
analysis conducted in the online appendix suggests that similar mechanisms are likely to operate in the
other OECD countries.
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